

+ EPA-NCEE Seminar

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*Scientific Uncertainty and
the Risks of Climate Change*

Jay Gulledge, PhD

Senior Scientist and

Program Manager for Science & Impacts

Pew Center on Global Climate Change




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+ Outline


- # • The warming globe
- # • External forcing, not internal variability
- + • External forcing mostly from human activities
- # • Impacts are here and caused by human-induced warming
- # • Projected impacts are significant
- # • Uncertainty and risk
- + • Economically correct response to uncertainty about risk
- # • Under-pricing risk is risky

Global Surface Warming





Data Crown copyright 2006
Brohan (2006) JGR

+ Observed Climate Change: Sea Level Rise







Global Mountain Glacier Retreat




Polar Ice Loss

Annual Extremes of Arctic Sea Ice Extent






Greenland Annual Melt Area (Apr-Oct)



NASA

Antarctica Temperature Trend (1957-2006)



Steig et al. 2009, *Nature* 457:459

+ Polar Ice Loss

Satellite Measurements of Ice Sheet Mass Balance

| Study | EAIS MB Gt year ⁻¹ | WAIS MB Gt year ⁻¹ | AIS MB Gt year ⁻¹ | GIS MB Gt year ⁻¹ |
|-------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Wingham <i>et al.</i> (7)* | -1 ± 53 | -59 ± 50 | -60 ± 76 | |
| Krabill <i>et al.</i> (8)* | | | | -47 |
| Rignot and Thomas (9)† | 22 ± 23 | -48 ± 14 | -26 ± 37 | |
| Davis and Li (17)* | | | 42 ± 23 | |
| Davis <i>et al.</i> (10)* | 45 ± 7 | | | |
| Velicogna and Wahr (11)‡ | | | | -75 ± 21 |
| Zwally <i>et al.</i> (18)* | 16 ± 11 | -47 ± 4 | -31 ± 12 | 11 ± 3 |
| | | | | -83 ± 28 |
| Rignot and Kanagaratnam (12)† | | | | -127 ± 28 |
| | | | | -205 ± 38 |
| Velicogna and Wahr (20)‡ | 0 ± 51 | -136 ± 19 | -139 ± 73 | |
| Ramillien <i>et al.</i> (19)‡ | 67 ± 28 | -107 ± 23 | -40 | -129 ± 15 |
| Wingham <i>et al.</i> (14)* | | | 27 ± 29 | |
| Velicogna and Wahr (13)‡ | | | | -227 ± 33 |
| Chen <i>et al.</i> (15)‡ | | | | -219 ± 21 |
| Luthcke <i>et al.</i> (16)‡ | | | | -101 ± 16 |
| Range | -1 to 67 | -136 to -47 | -139 to 42 | -227 to 11 |
| Median Estimate | +33 | -91.5 | -48.5 | -108 |

+ IPCC Consensus Statement

+ *Warming of the climate system*
+ *is **unequivocal**, as is now evident*
+ *from observations of increases*
+ *in global average air and ocean*
+ *temperatures, widespread*
+ *melting of snow and ice, and*
+ *rising global average sea level*

IPCC 2007

+ Outline

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- + • Economically correct response to uncertainty about risk
- + • Under-pricing risk is risky

+ Physical Laws: Internal Variability

+ Internal variability

- Natural cycles

- + • El Niño/Southern Oscillation

- Pacific Decadal Oscillation

- + • Arctic/Antarctic Oscillations

- Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation

- + • Move energy from one place to another

- No net change of heat in climate system

+

+ Physical Laws: External Forcing

- + • Net energy (heat) change in the climate system as a whole
- + • Natural forcings
 - + • Solar irradiance
 - + • Volcanic emissions
- + • Manmade forcings
 - + • Greenhouse gases
 - + • Anthropogenic aerosols
- + • Feedbacks—internal response that amplifies or dampens effect of external forcing

+

+ Internal Variability or External Forcing?

How to distinguish between internal variability and external forcing?

Is the climate system as a whole gaining heat?


- **Yes:** External forcing is required
- **No:** No significant external forcing

#

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Physical Laws: Energy Budget

Heat Uptake, 1955-2003



+ External Forcing is responsible


+ Detection of external forcing

- All climate components are gaining energy
- Vast majority of new heat is in the ocean; other components cannot compensate (not internal variability)
- ***External forcing detected***
(based on physical laws, not models)
- Claims that “natural cycles” are to blame must explain net gain of heat in system.

+ Outline


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History of Atmospheric CO₂




IPCC 2007


Human Contribution to Atmospheric CO₂



Manmade CO₂ Emissions are Growing Faster than Expected




Evidence of Manmade CO₂



Causes of Global Warming

Temperature, CO₂, and Sunspots





• The increase of CO₂ can explain recent warming

• Sun's activity cannot explain recent warming


Natural Variability: Volcanic Eruptions

- We know volcanoes cool the Earth temporarily from both theory and observations
- The five largest eruptions since 1880 all had similar effect




+ Natural Variability: Volcanic Eruptions


- + • Volcanic activity has a net cooling effect
- + • Some of the early warming may have been from low volcanic activity
- + • Higher volcanic activity during the second half of the 20th century
- + • Most of the warming was after 1975




+ Attribution: Possible External Forcings



+ Attribution: Net External Forcing




Causes of Global Warming



Meehl 2004, J. Climate 17:3721


Global Ocean Warming Trend

Change in Ocean Heat Content
(1955-2008)




Levitus 2009, *GRL* 36:doi:10.1029/2008GL037155

Global Ocean Warming Trend



Human Fingerprint in the Ocean



+ IPCC Consensus Statement

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*Most of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-20th century is **very likely*** due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations.*



IPCC 2007

*Very Likely: >90% chance


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
Observed Impacts: Extreme Precipitation






+ Observed Climate Change: Flooding Frequency



Observed Impacts: Temperature Extremes




Observed Impacts: Global Drought




Observed Climate Change: Wildfire Fire Frequency

Area burned in the Western US has increased 6-fold in the last 30 years.



- Longer growing season
- Earlier snowmelt
- Hotter summers


Observed Climate Change: Hurricane Intensity



Source: Elsner et al. (2008) The increasing intensity of the strongest tropical cyclones. *Nature* 455:92-95.

Observed Impacts: Ocean CO₂ & Acidity

- When CO₂ dissolves in water, it makes carbonic acid
- Ocean pH has dropped 0.1 unit since ~1950
- 0.2 unit drop damages shell-forming marine organisms
- Coral reefs provide ~70% of protein for low-latitude developing countries and huge part of global biodiversity
- Planktonic algae are the base of the food chain in the open ocean



+ IPCC Consensus Statement

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*A global assessment of data since 1970 has shown it is **likely*** that anthropogenic warming has had a discernible influence on many physical and biological systems.*

IPCC 2007

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
*Very Likely: >66% chance

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
Projected Impacts: Water Availability

Projected Surface Water in 2050 Relative to 1900-1970




Milly et al. *Nature* 2005, updated


Projected Impacts: Crop Sensitivity





Projected Impacts: Sea Level Rise



Sea Level Rise in Viet Nam








Projected Impacts: Climate Extremes


- Projected climate extremes
 - (a) precipitation intensity
 - (b) dry days
 - (c) heat waves



Projected Impacts: Climate Extremes


Climate on the Move:

Changing Summers in the Midwest




U.S. Climate Change Science Program Draft Unified Synthesis Product Report, NOAA 2008.

+ Increased heat wave frequency



Source: U.S. CCSP Draft Unified Synthesis Product, 14 July, 2008.

+ Observed Impacts: Oceans acidifying




Hadley Centre for Climate Prediction and Research

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

What can Models Tell Us?

Projected Warming 1975-2085



What can Models Tell Us?

Observed Warming 1960 to 2000



+ What can Models Tell Us?

Many predicted changes have been observed

- + • Land surface warming more than sea surface
- + • Northern Hemisphere warming more than SH
- + • Polar ice sheets are losing ice
- + • Mountain glacier retreat is accelerating
- + • Arctic sea ice decreasing - area & volume
- + • Sea level rise is accelerating
- + • Precipitation is increasing in wet regions and decreasing in dry regions
- + • Northern ecosystems changing as predicted

Large-scale patterns are developing as predicted

+ What can Models **Not** Tell Us?

+ Many risk-intensive issues are unresolved

- Timing and magnitude of future change
- + • Regional details of future change
- Timing/effect of positive feedbacks
- + • Thresholds/tipping points/irreversibility

+ **Where and when will climate change abruptly or irreversibly or catastrophically?**

+ Structural Uncertainties in Models

+ Amplifying (positive) feedbacks are omitted

- + • Net ecosystem C loss (increases CO₂ efflux)
- + • Ocean CO₂ outgassing (lower solubility)
- + • Permafrost thaw emitting methane
- + • Some evidence that these feedbacks could be happening already

+ Nonlinearities

- + • Nonlinear responses to warming
- + • Discontinuities—thresholds that shift climate components to new states


+ **Models may systematically underestimate warming per unit of man-made greenhouse gas emitted**

+ **Projections Underestimate Change**


- # 1) Large polar ice sheets losing ice 100 years sooner than expected (IPCC 2007; Shepherd & Wingham 2007, *Science*)
- # 2) Small glaciers & ice caps losing ice faster than projected (Meier et al. 2007, *Science*)
- # 3) Boreal forests are responding to global warming sooner than expected (Soja et al. 2007, *Global & Planetary Change*)
- # 4) Observed sea level rise nearly 2X faster than projected (Rahmstorf et al. 2007, *Science*)
- # 5) Global precipitation changing 2X faster than projected (Wentz et al. 2007, *Science*; Zhang et al. 2007, *Nature*)
- # 6) Observed Arctic sea ice loss 3X faster than projected (Stroeve et al. 2007, *Geophysical Research Letters*)

Models may underestimate response per unit warming


Projections Underestimate Change



Projections Underestimate Change



+ Range of Uncertainty Informs Risk



+ Asymmetry of Uncertainty


+ *“A [sea level] rise by over one meter by 2100 for strong warming scenarios cannot be ruled out... On the other hand, very low sea level rise values as reported in the IPCC... now appear rather implausible in the light of the observational data.”*

Rahmstorf, 2007 Science

+ **Uncertainty about sea level rise is at the upper end, not the lower end.**


+ Ice Sheets and Sea Level Rise

- Potential for catastrophic sea level rise
- + • Destabilization threshold 1-4 °C
- Timing very uncertain—not necessarily far in the future



5m

7m



Courtesy of M. Oppenheimer

+ Previous Rapid Sea Level Rise

nature geoscience | ADVANCE ONLINE PUBLICATION

LETTERS

+

High rates of sea-level rise during the last interglacial period

+

E. J. ROHLING^{1*}, K. GRANT¹, CH. HEMLEBEN^{2*}, M. SIDDALL³, B. A. A. HOOGAKKER⁴, M. BOLSHAW¹
AND M. KUCERA²

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
Published online: 16 December 2007; doi:10.1038/ngeo.2007.28

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
“We find average rates of sea-level rise of 1.5 m [5 ft.] per century. As global mean temperatures ... were comparable to projections for future climate change under the influence of anthropogenic greenhouse-gas emissions these observed rates of sea-level change inform the ongoing debate about high versus low rates of sea-level rise in the coming century.”

+

+ Asymmetry of Uncertainty



Asymmetry of Uncertainty




Asymmetry of uncertainty = Elevated Risk

+ Asymmetry of Uncertainty

Revised IPCC Reasons for Concern

IPCC 3rd Assessment (2001)

Post-4th Assessment (2009)



Smith et al., *PNAS* 2004

+ Risks of Climate Change



+ Accurate risk perception is critical to effective decision making.

- + ➤ Low probability does not equal low risk.
- + ➤ Risk is high where high-impact outcomes are plausible, even if probability is low.
- + ➤ The likelihood of severe or catastrophic outcomes is probably significantly higher than the public and decision makers realize.

+

Perception of Risk


Myth—Smooth/gradual climate change




- Model projections average over large space and long time.
- Gives false impression of smooth/gradual future change.

+ Perception of Risk


Myth—Smooth/gradual climate change



Perception of Risk



+ Perception of Risk




3/4th of the 4,000 offshore oil and gas platforms (under MMS) were directly in the combined paths of the two hurricanes. Leading up to each hurricane, virtually all Gulf coast production and import facilities and many of the region's refining/processing facilities were evacuated or operations were otherwise suspended.

+ Perception of Risk

Myth – *Industrialized world spared*


+ Projected Surface Water in 2050 Relative to 1900-1970




+ Perception of Risk

Myth – *Industrialized world will be spared*


+ Coastal Exposure to Sea Level Rise



Avoiding the Greatest Risks



Risk of Overshooting



+ Risk of Surprises: Impacts NOT Projected

- # 1) Abrupt, extreme sea level rise
- # 2) Death by a Thousand Cuts
Familiar extreme events increase nonlinearly everywhere
- # 3) The George Foreman Effect
A particular type of extreme event strikes repeatedly on primary population centers or food-producing regions
- # 4) Breadbasket Bandits
Atmospheric reorganization shifts rain belts away from grain-exporting regions
- # 5) Geo-engineering: Self-inflicted Abrupt Change
Attempts to engineer the climate stimulate rapid warming or atmospheric reorganization

+ Risk of Irreversibility

- + • Manmade CO₂ emissions have accelerated beyond the highest projections.
(Canadell 2008)
- + • Half of the carbon we emit to the atmosphere is permanent on social time scales.
(IPCC 2007)
- + • Warming from manmade CO₂ causes additional CO₂ to accumulate in the atmosphere.
(IPCC 2007)
- + • Warming resulting from CO₂ emissions persists for more than 1000 years.
(Matthews & Caldeira 2008; Solomon et al. 2009)

+ Risks from Climate Change

+ Risks from climate change are high

- + ➤ Catastrophic change can happen but is uncertain.
- + ➤ U.S. has naturally high exposure to climate impacts.
- + ➤ Abrupt regional changes are likely but unpredictable.
- + ➤ Models are correct about patterns yet underestimate magnitude of observed change.
- + ➤ Thresholds/tipping points are real but unpredictable.
- + ➤ Uncertainty about timing and magnitude of change.
- + ➤ Uncertainty about regional details of change.
- + ➤ Uncertainty is skewed toward more severe impacts.

+ Outline

- # • The warming globe
- # • External forcing, not internal variability
- + • External forcing mostly from human activities
- # • Impacts are here and caused by human-induced warming
- # • Projected impacts are significant
- # • Uncertainty and risk
- + • Economically correct response to uncertainty about risk
- # • Under-pricing risk is risky

+ Pew Center Workshop

+ **Assessing The Economic Benefits of Avoided Climate Change**

March 16-17, 2009

- + •75 experts discussed the science, risks, and economics of climate change
- + •Keynote addresses by Dina Kruger (EPA Climate Change Director) & Gary Yohe (IPCC Lead Author)
- + •17 video presentations by experts on climate change impacts and economics
- + •OMB recommendations on the use of CBA

<http://www.pewclimate.org/benefitsworkshop-March09>

+ Climate Change Economics

Problems with quantifying economic impacts


- ✦ • Time scale (intergenerational)
- ✦ • Scientific uncertainties
 - ✦ – Timing, distribution, severity of impacts
 - Potential for abrupt, catastrophic changes
- ✦ • Economic uncertainties
 - ✦ – Future return on investments
 - Social risk perception and aversion
 - Value of nonmarket goods & services
 - ✦ – Pricing of unknown, non-zero probability of catastrophe
- ✦ • Unresolved ethical questions
 - ✦ – Proper rate of intergenerational discounting
 - Proper role of public investment vs. private investment
(Should risk be handled differently?)

Omitted Impacts

| Incomplete impacts inventory | | Uncertainty in Valuation of Impacts → | | |
|-----------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| | | Market | Non-Market | Socially Contingent |
| Uncertainty in Predicting Climate Change ↓ | Projection (e.g., mean sea level Rise; mean temperature change) | I • Coastal protection • Loss of dryland • Energy for heating and cooling | IV • Heat stress • Wetland loss | VII • Regional costs • Investment |
| | Bounded Risks (e.g. droughts, floods, storms) | II • Agriculture • Water Variability | V • Ecosystem change • Biodiversity • Loss of life • Secondary social effects | VIII • Comparative advantage • Market structures |
| | System change & surprises (e.g. major events) | III • Above, plus • Significant loss of land and resources • Non-marginal effects | VI • Higher order • Social effects • Regional collapse | IX • Regional collapse |

Yohe & Tirpak, *IA Journal*, 2008

+ Fat-Tailed Risks



Fat Tails = Elevated Risk

+ Climate Change Economics

+ Economically correct response to uncertainty

- + • What we know
 - + – The planet is warming
 - + – Climate is changing at accelerating rates
 - + – Manmade GHGs are the principal cause
 - + – Human-induced climate change contributed to the 2003 European heat-wave that killed tens of thousands

+ *“Even though substantial uncertainties persist ... this knowledge is sufficient to establish the need to respond in the near-term...”*

+ *“Indeed, looking at uncertainty through a risk-management lens makes the case for near-term action...”*

+ *“It then follows from simple economics that this near-term action should begin immediately if we are to minimize the expected cost of meeting any long-term objective.”*

(Economist Gary Yohe, 2009)

+ Outline

- # • The warming globe
- # • External forcing, not internal variability
- + • External forcing mostly from human activities
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- # • Uncertainty and risk
- + • Economically correct response to uncertainty about risk
- # • Under-pricing risk is risky

+ Under-pricing Risk

+ *“In 2005, I raised concerns that the protracted period of underpricing of risk, if history was any guide, would have dire consequences. This crisis, however, has turned out to be much broader than anything I could have imagined.”*

+ *“...those of us who have looked to the self-interest of lending institutions to protect shareholder’s equity (myself especially) are in a state of shocked disbelief. Such counterparty surveillance is a central pillar of our financial markets’ state of balance. If it fails, as occurred this year, market stability is undermined.”*

+ *“It was the failure to properly price such risky assets that precipitated the crisis.”*

Former Fed Chairman, Alan Greenspan
prepared testimony to the House Committee
on Government Oversight and Reform
October 23, 2008

+ Under-pricing Risk

+ *“What is the essence of the economic problem posed by climate change? The economic uniqueness of the climate-change problem is not just that today’s decisions have difficult-to-reverse impacts that will be felt very far out into the future... Much more unsettling for an application of (present discounted) expected utility analysis are the unknowns: deep structural uncertainty in the science coupled with an economic inability to evaluate meaningfully the catastrophic losses from disastrous temperature changes.”*

+ *“Even just acknowledging more openly the incredible magnitude of the deep structural uncertainties that are involved in climate-change analysis—and explaining better to policy makers that the artificial crispness conveyed by conventional IAM-based CBAs here is especially and unusually misleading compared with more-ordinary non-climate-change CBA situations—might go a long way towards elevating the level of public discourse concerning what to do about global warming.”*

+ Economist Martin Weitzman, On Modeling and Interpreting the Economics of Catastrophic Climate Change

+ Pew Center Workshop – Key Insights

R. Howarth: “For a broad class of models”

- + •“The discount rate is set equal to the risk-free rate (~1.0%) plus a risk premium (Howarth, 2009; Howarth and Borsuk, 2009)”
- + •“The risk premium is negative for precautionary actions that reduce perceived risks to future social welfare”
 - Implies willingness to pay more than the expected value for investments if they provide a safety net for consumption under uncertainty:
- + *“Insurance pays off exactly when wealth and consumption would otherwise be low—you get a check when your house burns down. For this reason, you are happy to hold insurance, even though you expect to lose money—even though the price of insurance is greater than its expected payoff discounted at the risk-free rate” (Cochrane 2005)*
- + •Public goods in particular are viewed as precautionary investments that warrant risk-free discounting.

+ Pew Center Workshop – Key Insights

+ **R. Howarth:** Standard Ramsey discounting model is unable to simulate observed behavior under uncertainty.

+ •The discounting argument between Stern and Nordhaus is intractable in the Ramsey framework.

– **Stern:** to be fair to future generations, pure time preference = 0

+ – **Nordhaus:** To maximize fairness across generations, discount rate should be set to the market rate of return (~6-7%)

+ •Both arguments are subjective.

+ •Empirical observations of investment behavior support neither assertion, per se, although Stern is numerically closer.

+
+

+ Pew Center Workshop – Key Insights

+ R. Howarth: “For a broad class of models”

+ *“Insurance pays off exactly when wealth and consumption would otherwise be low—you get a check when your house burns down. For this reason, you are happy to hold insurance, even though you expect to lose money—even though the price of insurance is greater than its expected payoff discounted at the risk-free rate.”*

+ Cochrane 2005

+ Climate Change Economics

+ Risk-reduction framework

- + • Climate stabilization is viewed as insurance against catastrophe and distributional inequality (the poor impacted most)
- + • Climate stabilization goals are based on science-driven risk assessment that informs values-based policy decisions
- + • Economic analysis finds the most cost-effective and distributionally fair policies to achieve established goals

+ For More Information

✦



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